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THEORIZING THE FIRM:
ORGANIZATIONAL ONTOLOGY IN
THE SUPREME COURT
Eric W. Orts*
Imaginary creatures are notoriously nimble.
—John Dewey1
INTRODUCTION
In two leading cases in the last several years, the U.S. Supreme
Court revitalized interest in questions of “legal personality,” specifi-
cally with respect to business firms.  Some legal theorists believe that
the realist tradition, culminating in a seminal article by the philoso-
pher John Dewey, disposed of the need to inquire very deeply into the
“nature” of organizations, notwithstanding their legal attributes as
“persons”—including various rights and duties, not least the ability to
be represented in litigation.2  Writing during the legal realist period in
American jurisprudence, Dewey believed that questions of legal per-
sonality should turn not on any inquiry “regarding the nature of
things” (such as corporations) but rather on an examination “in terms
of consequences” (such as determining what it would mean practically
to recognize corporations as having rights or duties in particular cir-
* Guardsmark Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.  For comments, I thank Greg Mark and the other participants at the 21st
Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy: The Supreme Court, Business and
Civil Justice at DePaul University College of Law, as well as my colleague, Amy Sepinwall.
1. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655
(1926).
2. Consider, for example, the following observation by a leading constitutional scholar:
I do not address . . . the formerly much-mooted question of whether corporations “are”
persons in some ontological sense, whether because aggregating individuals into the
corporate form somehow transforms the latter into a “person” or because they are
“real” in some other sense.  I am too much of a legal realist to think that these ques-
tions hold any interest after John Dewey.
Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. ONLINE 70, 70 n.3 (2013) (citing Dewey, supra note 1).  Tushnet goes on to recognize, R
however, that recent cases appear to be “reviving interest” in these questions.  Id.  Gregory
Mark also accurately diagnosed the historical decline regarding theoretical interest in questions
of the personality of corporations and other organizational entities. See Gregory A. Mark, Com-
ment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441
(1987).
559
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cumstances).3  Given that the law designates organizations, such as
corporations and other business firms, as having various attributes, in-
cluding rights and duties, it then follows from Dewey’s pragmatic ap-
proach that the idea of a legal person “signifies what law makes it
signify.”4  He advocates for an analysis based on the likely social con-
sequences of recognizing one feature or another of an organization,
such as a business corporation, and he declares that nothing much
turns of the use of “person” in this context.5  For example, a “right-
and-duty bearing unit” would be an adequate, though perhaps awk-
ward, synonym for an organizational “person.”6
3. Dewey, supra note 1, at 660.  Dewey follows in the tradition of the American pragmatism R
and quotes Charles S. Peirce: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these ef-
fects is the whole of our conception of the object.” Id. at 661 (quoting CHARLES S. PEIRCE,
CHANCE, LOVE, AND LOGIC: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 45 (Morris R. Cohen ed., 1923)).  More
broadly, Dewey argues that this approach is consistent with the scientific principle known as
“extensive abstraction,” which provides that “what really matters to science is . . . that any set of
terms with the right mutual relations will answer all scientific purposes as well as any other set
with the same sort of relations.” Id. (quoting C.D. BROAD, SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 39 (1923)); see
also W.V. Quine, Russell’s Ontological Development, 63 J. PHIL. 657, 667 (1966) (describing
Bertrand Russell’s “definition by abstraction” as related to “what [Alfred Whitehead] came to
call extensive abstraction, and [Rudolf Carnap] quasianalysis”).
4. Dewey, supra note 1, at 655. R
5. In Dewey’s words:
Molecules and trees certainly have social consequences; but these consequences are
what they are irrespective of having rights and duties.  Molecules and trees would con-
tinue to behave exactly as they do whether or not rights and duties were ascribed to
them; their consequences would be what they are anyway.  But there are some things,
bodies singular and corporate, which clearly act differently, or have different conse-
quences, depending upon whether or not they possess rights and duties, and according
to what specific rights they possess and what obligations are placed upon them.  If the
logical principle be granted, it is a factual matter what bodies have the specifiable con-
sequences and what these consequences are; but it becomes a verbal matter whether we
call them all “persons” or whether we call some of them persons and not others—or
whether we abandon the use of the word entirely.
Id. at 661–62.
Note that one scholar has famously taken the flexibility of legal definition suggested by Dewey
to recommend that the law should in fact occasionally recognize “trees” and other natural ob-
jects as legal persons with rights.  Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972); see also CHRISTOPHER D.
STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (3d ed.
2010) (revising and expanding on the original thesis).  The legal recognition of ships as “persons”
in admiralty law is another example of the extension of the concept to inanimate objects. See,
e.g., O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 26–27 (1881) (“It is only by supposing the ship to
have been treated as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the
maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once become consistent
and logical.”).
6. Dewey, supra note 1, at 656–58 (citing 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM R
MAITLAND 307 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911)).
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As Gregory Mark has rightly observed, the realist critique of the
legal personality of corporations and other business firms freed mod-
ern jurisprudence from long-standing debates among competing theo-
ries (e.g., firms as “real entities” or “fictions”), but it did so at a cost.
The realists—and the contemporary scholars following them—
“robbed corporation theory of its larger intellectual content” and
“failed to replace the rhetorical tradition of personification because it
had nothing to replace it with.”7
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission8 and Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.9 are two recent and iconic cases in which
the U.S. Supreme Court follows in the realist tradition of leaving theo-
ries of the firm underpinning its decisions relatively unspoken and
unexamined.  As I argue in this Article, the opinions in these cases
tend to follow pragmatic arguments to reach opposing points of view
concerning whether business corporations should be permitted to hold
and assert certain kinds of legal “rights” as organizational persons.10
Citizens United addresses the scope of the ability of corporations to
assert political rights and claim the protection of freedom of speech
under the First Amendment against campaign finance restrictions.11
Hobby Lobby concerns the question of whether business corporations
can assert religious rights to claim exemptions from otherwise gener-
ally applicable laws regarding health care insurance coverage for cer-
tain methods of contraception.12
My main argument here is that in both cases—which may illustrate
a more general contemporary analytical bias—the Supreme Court has
undertheorized the nature of business firms and, therefore, missed
some important implications that would have helped to clarify the le-
gal analysis if not change the eventual results.  Closer attention to a
legal theory of the firm reveals the complexity surrounding the con-
temporary structures of business organizations and their interactions
7. Mark, supra note 2, at 1482.  An exception, as Mark noted, was the legal realist Thurman R
Arnold who continued to address questions of corporate personification and autonomy as prom-
inent. Id. (citing THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937)). More re-
cently, legal scholars who adopted economics as their preferred mode of analysis rushed into the
theoretical vacuum, fitting economic theories of the firm to legal purposes with economic effi-
ciency as their pragmatic guide.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991), for the most influential example.
8. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9. 134 S. Ct. 2757 (2014).
10. I have inquired elsewhere, along with a co-author, about the nature of the “organizational
rights” illustrated in these cases and others. See Eric W. Orts & Amy Sepinwall, Privacy and
Organizational Persons, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2275, 2275–76, 2286–96, 2318–19 (2015).
11. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–19.
12. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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with other major institutions in modern society.  A better appreciation
of the theoretical canvas on which the Court is painting would help to
guide, or at least better understand, future decisions that will inevita-
bly follow in the areas of institutional crossover between the worlds of
business and government (as in Citizens United) and business and re-
ligion (as in Hobby Lobby).
Although Dewey was correct to point out that the legal personality
of firms is highly flexible and variable, he emphasized that corpora-
tions and other organizational persons were created by law as “con-
crete facts and relations.”13  Recent philosophical works by John
Searle, Philip Pettit, and others also suggest that the law contributes to
the construction of a “social ontology,” which includes a world popu-
lated by various kinds of organizational persons.14  I suggest that it is
useful—indeed “realistic” in the deepest sense of the word—to revisit
the legal and social ontology of business firms.  Better understanding
what these business firms are in terms of their legal and social con-
struction will put the Supreme Court, as well as legislators and other
policy makers, in a better position to make decisions concerning them,
rather than taking a view that organizational ontology doesn’t mat-
ter.15  To ignore organizational ontology is actually to adopt one or
another ontological view unconsciously, ignorantly, or manipulatively.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides a brief philosoph-
ical account of a legal and social ontology of business firms, drawing in
particular on arguments by Dewey.  The main argument is to recog-
nize that social constructions of “business persons” exist and have a
legal ontology by which they can be described and understood.16
Some amendments and extensions of Dewey’s views are suggested in
light of Searle’s, Pettit’s, and others’ recent scholarship in what has
been called “social metaphysics.”17
Part III then reexamines the opinions in Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby.  I show how the majority and the principal dissenting opinions
in these cases tend to undertheorize the legal nature of the firm and
13. Dewey, supra note 1, at 673. R
14. See infra notes 35–61 and accompanying text (discussing the works of these philosophers). R
15. Other scholars have also observed that Citizens United and Hobby Lobby have put ques-
tions about the ontology of firms back on the table. See, e.g., Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate
Rights and Organization Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 501 (2016)  (“Corporate ontology is
back in vogue.”).
16. For this connection, I also draw on previous work. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS:
A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 40–41 (rev. ed. 2015).
17. See SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS: THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY (Frederick F. Schmitt
ed., 2003) (collecting essays by some leading philosophers on the topic, including Margaret Gil-
bert, Philip Pettit, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela).
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why this failure of theory matters.18  In particular, I suggest that the
results in both cases might be called into question with a more robust
theoretical grounding based on conceptions of the legal structure of
business firms and their role in modern society.  Closer attention to
“the concrete facts and relations” that underlie the construction and
existence of organizations such as business firms allows for a clearer
view of legal and policy alternatives available for their governance.
II. THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF THE BUSINESS FIRM
Competing theories of firms, including business corporations, have
been around since leading jurists traded alternative ideas in ancient
Rome.19  The main variants see business firms and other associational
organizations as either creations of the political state (i.e., “top-down”
or “concession” theories) or constructions of individual participants
(i.e., “bottom-up” or “aggregate” theories).20  Examples illustrating a
mostly top-down description include the historical East India Com-
pany sponsored by England (and another by Holland) in the early
seventeenth century and contemporary state-owned enterprises in
China.  Examples illustrating a mostly bottom-up description include
the many and highly complex private business enterprises that are
constantly created and operated by business participants in most, if
not all, countries today (including China).21  The bottom-up construc-
tion of firms of many varieties is enabled by modern organizational
18. I have previously suggested that the Supreme Court has “undertheorized” the firm in the
two cases, and I extend that argument here. See ORTS, supra note 16, passim; Eric Orts, Un- R
dertheorizing the Corporation Continued: Hobby Lobby and Employees’ Rights, CONGLOMER-
ATE (July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/undertheorizing-the-corporation-
continued-hobby-lobby-and-employees-rights.html.
19. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Histori-
cal Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 773–75 (2005) (re-
viewing three theories of the corporation that originated in Roman jurisprudence).  I appreciate
that “firm” is a relatively recent concept, which embraces various different legal forms of enter-
prise.  Although commonly associated with economic theories, the origin of the term lies in the
Italian word firma, which refers to the legal entity of a business enterprise as opposed to the
accounting entity (ragione) or credit entity (ditta). ORTS, supra note 16, at 34. R
20. For a further discussion of these theories, see ORTS, supra note 16, at 9–14, 13 tbl.1.1. R
21. The English East India Company was originally chartered in 1600, and its Dutch counter-
part was first established in 1602. DAVID B. ABERNETHY, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL DOMI-
NANCE:  EUROPEAN OVERSEAS EMPIRES, 1415–1980, at 61–62 (2000); NORMAN DAVIES,
EUROPE: A HISTORY 513 (1996); JOHN KEAY, THE HONOURABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY 18 (1991). See ORTS, supra note 16, at 111–12, for more R
information on Chinese enterprises, both state-owned and privately organized.  See id. at
194–200, for more information on state-owned enterprises as a type of firm.
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law granting and recognizing extensive powers and capacities of indi-
viduals to self-organize.22
In my view, the best answer to the apparent divide between the top-
down concession and bottom-up aggregate theories is to say that both
are right.  An institutional theory argues that most business firms are
both created by government (which is the source of law made either
by statutes or judicial decisions) and organized by people utilizing the
individualized powers and capacities provided to them under the
law.23  This institutional view follows John Dewey and the legal philos-
opher H.L.A. Hart in abjuring demands to choose strictly between a
“concession” or an “aggregate” view of the firm.24  Instead, both
views are correct: the law says whether a particular firm in a particular
context is mostly a creature of the government (e.g., a state-owned
Chinese enterprise or Amtrak) or mostly an aggregate construction
comprised of business participants putting capital and labor into a pri-
vate organizational structure (e.g., everyday partnerships, limited lia-
bility companies, and business corporations).25  An institutional
theory holds that the law provides a social matrix in which most busi-
ness firms and other organizations are both top-down creations of law
and bottom-up constructions of individual participants.26
A related jurisprudential debate has been waged concerning
whether firms (including corporations) should be considered “real en-
tities” or “artificial fictions.”27  Here again, Dewey’s seminal contribu-
22. The key legal innovation has been the adoption of “enabling rules” for organizational
construction. See ORTS, supra note 16, passim (citing various scholars); see also Henry R
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organization Law, 110 YALE L. J. 387,
390 (2000) (providing an economic explanation for the development of organizational law, in-
cluding the organizational “entity” or “person”); Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2006) (same).
23. ORTS, supra note 16, at 13 tbl.1.1, 14. R
24. Id. at 17–19 (citing Dewey, supra note 1, and H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Juris-
prudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 21, 21–48 (1983)).
25. An important dimension in legal theory concerns the distinction between “private” and
“public” organizations. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 109–31.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court R
provided an example of the practical importance of this distinction when it unanimously held
that Amtrak was essentially a “governmental entity” rather than a “private corporation” for
“purposes of determining the validity of the metrics and standards” that Amtrak had promul-
gated.  Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 (2015).
26. A full-fledged institutional theory of this kind also requires an account not only of firms as
legal persons, fictions, and entities but also as combinations of organizational contracts, property
relationships, and internal agency structures. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 30–105.  See id. at 73, R
225, 254, for the description of the law as a social “matrix” for firms.
27. A shorthand description of this debate refers to “nominalists” (believing in the fiction
theory) and “realists”—but realists in the sense of real entity theory rather than legal realism.
To avoid confusion, I will not use the term “realists” to refer to “real entity” proponents.  I
believe a contemporary legal realist perspective is consistent with the “institutional theory” of
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL216.txt unknown Seq: 7  2-AUG-16 9:45
2016] THEORIZING THE FIRM 565
tion cut through the metaphysical fog of this longstanding debate,
arguing that philosophical, theological, and other nonlegal concep-
tions of corporate personality are not determinative.28  In particular,
Dewey argues that theological arguments insisting on the “fictional”
nature of corporations (originally important in ecclesiastical debates)
do not determine contemporary legal questions.29  Political arguments
insisting on “real entity” theories are similarly indeterminate.30
Dewey’s breakthrough insight places the burden and responsibility
squarely on the legal definition of organizational personality, which, in
turn, derives from political and other institutional pressures that make
and form the law over time.  For Dewey, legal definitions of organiza-
tional personality are the product of “struggles and movements of im-
mense social import, economic and political.”31  These larger
historical “struggles and movements” include:
the conflict of church and empire in the middle ages; the conflict of
rising national states with the medieval Roman empire; the struggle
between dynastic [monarchical] and popular [democratic] represen-
tative forms of government; the conflict between feudal institutions
. . . and the economic needs produced by the industrial revolution
and the development of national territorial states; the conflict of the
“proletariat” with the employing and capitalist class; the struggle
between nationalism and internationalism, or trans-national rela-
tions, to mention only a few outstanding movements.32
In a nutshell, Dewey replaces ahistorical, conceptual debates about
organizational persons with an argument emphasizing historical con-
text and practical considerations of contemporary social and political
consequences regarding various legal ideas and definitions.  Although
some contemporary legal theorists fall victim to appealing to a new
nonlegal source for an “essentialist” view of the firm—most influen-
the firm described here.  In other words, firms are both fictions and real—or what I call “real
fictions.” See id. at 31–33.
28. In Dewey’s words, “non-legal considerations” include “considerations popular, historical,
political, moral, philosophical, metaphysical and, in connection with the latter, theological.”
Dewey, supra note 1, at 655. R
29. As Dewey observed, “the ‘fiction’ theory of the personality of corporate bodies . . . was
promulgated if not originated, by Pope Innocent IV” and subsequently elaborated by Thomas
Aquinas.  It is “hardly a coincidence,” Dewey pointed out, that “Pope Innocent was one of the
strongest upholders of the supremacy of spiritual over the temporal power[s].”  Id. at 665.
30. Dewey conflates real entity and concession theories somewhat, but his main point still
holds.  Theorists who designate corporations (and other entities) as creations or concessions of
political states tend to have a result-oriented perspective.  In particular, political states wishing
to regulate (or even eliminate) separate organizational persons emphasize that organizations are
mere “creatures” of government.  At the same time, real entity theories are often used to argue
against the imposition of political state power over organizations.
31. Dewey, supra note 1, at 664. R
32. Id.
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tially in the form of neoclassical economics33—others follow and up-
date Dewey’s historical and law-focused thesis.34
Contemporary philosophers such as John Searle reinforce Dewey’s
arguments that organizational persons are legally constructed yet have
a social reality.  Searle distinguishes between “brute facts,” which are
the subject of scientific inquiry concerning the physical and material
substance of the universe, and “institutional facts,” which human be-
ings create through language and through institutions that language
enables human beings to establish (such as governments and legal sys-
tems).35  He develops “a general theory of the ontology of social facts
and social institutions.”36
For Searle, a business firm is an example of a socially constructed
and defined institution.37  It does not exist in “nature” in the same
sense that human beings, other animals, plants, or other parts of the
material world objectively exist.  It also does not exist in an objective
metaphysical ideal realm separated from human society.38  Neverthe-
less, the business firm exists as a social entity in practical reality.  It
develops as a social institution in the course of history and through
complex interactions of law, economics, and politics.  It is constructed,
defined, and instantiated through social practice.  Human beings act-
ing in society invent the business firm and establish it over time.
Therefore, it is an artificially created fictional institution that never-
theless has “real” social effects and consequences.
As Searle argues, an objective “social reality” exists in addition to
the objective material reality of physics, chemistry, and biology.  “So-
cial facts,” which are only “facts by human agreement,” do not exist in
the same sense as atoms, mountains, plants, and animals, but they are
nonetheless “epistemically objective.”39  We know social facts exist
33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
34. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspec-
tives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE L. J. 201 (1990); Mark, supra note 2. R
35. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 2 (1995).
36. Id. at xii; see also JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD:  THE STRUCTURE OF
HUMAN CIVILIZATION at ix, 3–5, 10–11 (2010) (explaining the ontology of institutional facts and
social facts).
37. As I have examined elsewhere, business firms come in many different legal forms and
combinations. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 175–222. R
38. In this respect, Searle’s view is consonant with Dewey’s. See supra notes 28–32 and ac- R
companying text.  These institutional theories (as I would describe them) are therefore not liable
to the charge leveled at some real entity theories, which posit a metaphysical existence in a
supernatural or theological sense.
39. SEARLE, supra note 35, at 1–13.  Searle’s distinction here is similar to the distinction made R
by other philosophers between “natural kinds” and “functional kinds.”  For a classic account of
“natural kinds,” see SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980).  For a contemporary
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because we live in a society that constructs them and gives them
meaning.  Searle explains this phenomenon by describing social and
institutional facts in contrast with the “brute facts” of physical reality.
Simple social facts include everyday examples of human coopera-
tion, such as two people agreeing to push a car to get it started or
deciding to take a walk together.  Margaret Gilbert, another contem-
porary philosopher of social ontology, gives the example of two peo-
ple who are traveling independently and then decide to share the
adventure through a tacit or explicit agreement to “join forces,” coor-
dinate, and travel together rather than separately.40  Their agreement
creates a transitory group with a shared purpose.41  Friendships and
love relationships are created and sustained in a similar fashion,
though often with a longer duration.  Mutual interactions and choices
transform some aspects of life from solitary into collective projects.
Long-term and relatively permanent social groups are possible when
people commit (or tacitly agree) to form relationships to act together
and share responsibility for long-run objectives, such as raising chil-
dren in a family, worshiping in a religious community, joining an army
or political bureaucracy, or binding together to share the benefits and
burdens of working collectively in a business enterprise.  A contribu-
tion of law is to reinforce some of these organizational group struc-
tures through the adoption of various formal rules and practices—
often with a normative view in mind of the intrinsic values or objec-
tives pursued by particular groups.
Searle makes a distinction between everyday informal social facts,
such as going for a walk together, going on a date, or hosting a party,
as compared with institutional facts, such as war, marriage, money, or
business firms.  These institutional facts involve the creation and
maintenance of various social rules, including legal rules, which in
turn create and reinforce background understandings among people
argument that law (and its creations and entities) are “functional kinds,” see Michael S. Moore,
Legal Reality: A Naturalist Approach to Legal Ontology, 21 LAW & PHIL. 619, 620–23, 684–93
(2002).
40. MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 161–64 (1989).
41. In this context, Gilbert refers to the creation of a “plural subject.” Id. at 18, 199–200.  A
related philosophical concept is the feasibility of the formation of “collective intentionality” of
social groups or plural subjects.  See SEARLE, supra note 35, at 23–51 (explaining collective inten- R
tionality); see also Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992)
(discussing group intentions); Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller, We-intentions, 53 PHIL. STUD.
367 (1988) (same).  For two of the most recent contributions, see MICHAEL E. BRATMAN,
SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER (2014) and MARGARET GIL-
BERT, JOINT COMMITMENT:  HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD (2014).
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living together in a society.42  More complex institutional facts are
therefore a subset of social facts that are created and maintained over
time through conventions such as language, political structures, legal
definition, economic ordering, and other patterns of human
interaction.43
Social and institutional facts are built on the brute facts of physical
reality (e.g., human beings and material objects), but they also objec-
tively exist in themselves “on top of brute physical facts.”44  Searle
argues that complex institutional facts—such as money, property,
marriage, and business firms—objectively exist because they are cre-
ated and maintained through the social use of rules and language in an
ongoing and established manner.45  Social facts recursively depend on
other institutions.  Social facts are self-referential and reflexive in the
sense that they are created and maintained through institutionalized
social practices and beliefs.  The primary constitutive institutions are
language and behavioral social norms.46
Social facts interact with brute facts.  A coin has an objective physi-
cal reality, but it is designated as “money” through institutional defini-
tion: a social agreement about what the coin represents in terms of an
institutional fact, namely, a certain value as property (or a symbol of
property) guaranteed by legal and political institutions (such as the
U.S. Treasury) and used in economic transactions in markets.47  A
business firm also combines elements of an objective reality—namely,
people working together, property collectively owned, and  products
42. See SEARLE, supra note 35, at 113–47.  For a description of the complexity of rules in R
social life, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
43. See SEARLE, supra note 35, at 31–51. For brevity’s sake, I am oversimplifying Searle’s R
theory, which also depends on understanding the role of collective intentionality, the use of
rules, and the attribution of “status functions.” Id. at 13–26, 43–57.
44. Id. at 29–35.  The “brute facts” of physical reality are logically prior to, and partial compo-
nents of, “institutional facts.” Id. at 34–35, 55–56, 120–25.
45. Id. at 34–35, 55–56.  Examples of institutional facts include money (Searle’s main illustra-
tion) as well as  “marriage, property, hiring, firing, war, revolutions, cocktail parties, govern-
ments, meetings, unions, parliaments, corporations, laws, restaurants, vacations, lawyers,
professors, doctors, medieval knights, and taxes.” Id.  at 79 (emphasis added).
46. See id. at 32–37, 52–53.  See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY
3–5, 26–28 (1984), for an additional discussion of the idea of “reflexivity” in the structure of
human relationships and society.
47. On the social and institutional fact of money, see SEARLE, supra note 35, passim.  Money R
itself is a phenomenon often taken for granted and deserving of more extended philosophical
and sociological analysis.  For a classic source expounding on this idea, see GEORG SIMMEL, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (David Frisby ed., Tom Bottomore & David Frisby trans., 3d ed. 2004).
For a more recent examination of this idea, see GEOFFREY INGHAM, THE NATURE OF MONEY
(2004).
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or services offered for sale—within an institutional definition of an
organizational entity or person.48
In his more recent work, Searle has also recognized that institu-
tional facts are possibly “freestanding” in the sense that no material
object or brute fact of the material world is required as a reference.49
In Searle’s terms, a “status function” is established when a constitutive
rule holds that “X counts as Y in context C.”  For example, natural
person (X) becomes king (Y) in context (C) when his father dies.50  A
freestanding Y occurs when constitutive rules create an institutional
fact in the abstract without a corresponding X as a material refer-
ence.51  Examples of a freestanding Y include some business corpora-
tions and electronic money.
When a corporation posits limited liability (as the law allows), it
cannot be reduced to actual human shareholders or other participants.
In Searle’s words:
[T]he whole idea of the limited liability corporation is that there
need not be any person or group of persons who is the corporation
because those persons would have to accept the liability of the cor-
poration if they were indeed identical with or constituted the corpo-
ration.  But [if] they are not identical with the corporation, the
corporation can exist, and continue to exist, even if it has no physi-
cal reality.52
A corporate lawyer may point out that Searle’s description of a corpo-
ration is somewhat oversimplified, but Searle is right in the general
thrust of his argument.  Legal principles of limited liability for the cor-
porate entity mean, at least in some circumstances, that there is a con-
ceptual separation of the corporation from its participants.53  Another
clear example is the use of a purely conceptual corporation when or-
ganizing a triangular merger, such as when Target Corporation X sets
up Subsidiary Corporation Y, which is then purchased by Acquiring
Corporation Z.54  In this legal sleight of hand, Subsidiary Corporation
48. A theory of the firm that describes how the law binds together property and people into
relationships of organizational governance, including agency relationships such as employment,
therefore stands within the same philosophical territory as charted by Dewey and Searle. ORTS,
supra note 16, at 9–105. R
49. SEARLE, supra note 36, at 20–21. R
50. See id. at 19–20.
51. Id. at 20 (citing Barry Smith, John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality, in JOHN
SEARLE 1 (Barry Smith ed., 2003)).
52. See SEARLE, supra note 36, at 20. R
53. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 32–40, 133–73 (describing the use of legal entities, principles of R
liability, and limited liability regarding business firms).
54. Id. at 38, 39 fig.1.1.
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Y is entirely abstract and nonmaterial, which is an example of Searle’s
freestanding Y.
Similarly, electronic money exists only as bits and symbols in com-
puters without a material representation in paper bills or metal coins.
“[I]n the case of electronic money,” Searle writes:
what exists are electronic representations of money; for example,
magnetic traces on computer disks in banks.  There need be no
physical realization of the money in the form of currency or specie;
all that exists physically is the magnetic traces on the computer
disks.  But these traces are representations of money, not money.55
These examples attest to the institution-building power of language
and rules.
If one accepts Searle’s account, then a conceptual starting point is
established that business firms exist as real fictions.56  The business
enterprise objectively exists as an institution through a combination of
collective intentionality, constitutive rules, the use of language, and
other socially created institutions (e.g., money, markets, law, and gov-
ernment).57  Social and institutional facts are complex and changeable,
but they exist as “socially real.”58
Other contemporary philosophers make broadly similar arguments
in support of an organizational ontology of business firms.  Philip Pet-
tit, for example, draws on Thomas Hobbes’ theory of representation
to argue that legal persons, such as corporations, are constructed by
law and require human beings to act as their representatives.  In this
sense, business corporations (as well as political commonwealths) are
“made with words.”59  This is consistent with the operation of the law
of agency within organizations.60  Human beings “personate” them-
selves in collective groups, and the law recognizes the existence and
55. SEARLE, supra note 36, at 20. R
56. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 33 (describing the business firm as a real fiction). R
57. See generally SEARLE, supra note 35, at 23–29, 37–51, 59–63, 76–78, 113–20 (explaining R
each of these socially created institutions).
58. Searle gives an introductory example of a French restaurant as an illustration of what he
calls the “complex structure of social reality,” much of which is “weightless and invisible.”  The
nature of a restaurant, the role of a waiter, and the use of money are institutional parts of this
social complexity of everyday life. Id. at 3–4.
59. PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS:  HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND POLITICS 70–81,
115–16 (2008).
60. As I have previously argued, agency law is a neglected but essential legal component of
business firms. ORTS, supra note 16, at 54–62; see also CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP R
AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011) (arguing for
the existence of “group agents” from a legal, political, and moral perspective).  Note that
“agency” is a term often used differently in law, philosophy, politics, and economics.
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representative structures of these groups, including the selection of
leaders to speak on behalf of the group.61
The foregoing account of the social ontology of business firms is
very much abbreviated.  However, it is sufficient for the current pur-
pose of proposing a foundational basis for inquiring into the organiza-
tional ontology of firms recently employed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in cases such as Citizens United and Hobby Lobby.  Unfortunately,
these cases exhibit a failure to think clearly about the legal and social
ontology of firms, including “the concrete facts and relations” that
Dewey and other theorists have encouraged us to examine.62
III. ORGANIZATIONAL ONTOLOGY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby implicitly involve conceptions or
theories of the business corporation and have a continuing interest
with respect to the use (and misuse) of these theories. In addition,
these cases are particularly important because they involve an attribu-
tion of rights to organizational persons, such as corporations, which
strike at core conceptions of the place of business firms in society.
Theories of the firm therefore matter to the extent that they are used
(or misused) to justify the results reached in these cases or accepted as
justifications in the future.  As others have also observed, Supreme
Court Justices have been notorious for their result-oriented selections
of a legal theory of the firm (i.e., top-down concession theory or bot-
tom-up participant theory) to fit preordained conclusions.  One
scholar writes:
Over the course of 200 years, the Court has articulated inconsistent
theories of the corporation—theories which seem to yield predict-
ably unpredictable judgments about the existence of a corporate
right.  When the Justices conclude that a regulation burdening in-
corporated firms is valid, they tend to emphasize the “artificial” na-
ture of corporations.  Because corporations come into being only by
virtue of the State’s affirmative charter, the State may regulate them
in a way it could not regulate natural persons.  The power to create
implies the power to regulate.  When, on the other hand, the Jus-
61. PETTIT, supra note 59, at 55–81 (describing two steps in the process: (1) using words to R
personate and (2) using words to incorporate); see also ORTS, supra note 16, at 40–51 (describing R
the construction of legal persons in terms drawn in part on Pettit and Hobbes).
62. Dewey, supra note 1, at 673.  Again, some scholars have misinterpreted Dewey to suggest R
that he counseled legal scholars to abjure inquiries about legal personality. See supra note 2 and R
accompanying text.  In my view, Dewey’s argument should be taken instead to empower the law
as against the competing conceptions of corporations or other organizational forms drawn from
various philosophical or theological movements.  In other words, legal ontology derives from
underlying political, economic, religious, and sociological theories that are instantiated in legal
practice in historical context.
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tices conclude that a corporation is entitled to object to government
action, they typically employ the logic of the “aggregate” theory of
the corporation.  The State’s authority is limited because firms are
composed of individuals who themselves have interests the State is
bound not to trample.63
Another scholar who has done a survey of the literature finds a
“deeply disturbing” consensus that the Supreme Court lacks “a coher-
ent approach or engagement with theoretical questions concerning the
nature of the firm.”64  Others deride the Court’s opinions on this score
as “‘ad hoc,’ ‘right-by-right,’ ‘arbitrary,’ [and] ‘sporadic.’”65  Going
forward, it would be beneficial to avoid this kind of inconsistent, inco-
herent style of theory selection.
An institutional legal theory of the firm proves helpful in this re-
spect for a couple of reasons.  First, such a theory allows for an under-
standing of the socially constructed nature of business enterprises
(and other organizations) and their “social reality.”  It therefore pro-
vides an intellectual justification for the flexibility of different results
under different circumstances.  Second, an institutional theory can
embrace the question of how business firms and other organizations
relate to other important institutions in society, including, especially in
the context of this Article, the institutions of political government and
religion.  There remains plenty of room for competing normative
views and disagreements once the distractions of old theories are
swept away and the concrete facts and relations of modern firms are
made plain.
A. Citizens United: The Place of Business in Politics
Citizens United is a titanic case because it steps into the long-stand-
ing and important question of the role that large and powerful busi-
ness firms should play in democratic political government, particularly
in the election of government officials.  It is not at all clear that the
Supreme Court needed to take this step.  The facts of the case, which
involve a nonprofit corporation organized specifically for political
purposes, did not initially raise the larger issue of whether a for-profit
corporation had a political right to speak and make financial expendi-
tures to support political candidates.66  Once again, however, Toc-
63. Buccola, supra note 15, at 501–02. R
64. Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95,
99 (2014).
65. Id. (quoting several legal scholars).
66. A number of narrower grounds were available to the Court, which would have avoided
the larger constitutional question. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
405 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he parties have advanced
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queville has been proven right, and the important question of the
place of business firms in politics gravitated toward a judicial resolu-
tion.67  Interestingly, Tocqueville also worried about the influence of
business in politics in the United States, foreseeing the possibility that
a new “aristocracy” could arise from among wealthy industrialists.68
Citizens United illustrates the tendency of judges to pick theories of
the firm to support their preferred results.69  Before examining the
different theories adopted by competing opinions in Citizens United,
however, it is useful to recall that this judicial ambivalence has deep
roots.  Sometimes different theories of the firm have even been in-
voked by the same Justice in different circumstances.  For example, in
two seminal historical cases regarding the constitutional rights of busi-
ness corporations, Justice Field adopted starkly different theories of
the corporation.70 Paul v. Virginia71 refused to recognize corporations
as citizens for purposes of constitutional protection under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72  “The
numerous ways to resolve the case that would facilitate electioneering by nonprofit advocacy
organizations such as Citizens United, without toppling statutes and precedents.”).  Justices in
the eventual majority, however, felt that the law had reached a state of impasse requiring them
to hear arguments at their own insistence on the constitutional political rights of corporations to
free speech. Id. at 329 (“[T]he Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without
chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amend-
ment.”); id. at 375 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“It should go without saying . . . that we cannot
embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right.”).
67. 2 ALEXIS DE  TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. and trans., 2000) (“There is almost no political question in the United
States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question.”).  As discussed in the sundry
opinions in Citizens United, the central question of the role of business firms in politics had a
long history of both precedents and statutes. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21; id. at
379–80 (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 387, 389 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 394–95 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 481 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
68. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67, at 530–32. R
69. See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United:
An Analysis of the Popular Movement To End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209, 246–47 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has never developed a unified theo-
retical justification for its conclusion that corporations are persons under the Constitution.  Thus,
there is no coherent, consistent way of defining corporate constitutional rights.  The effect is a
corporate personhood jurisprudence that often seems purely result-oriented.  The Court has uti-
lized conflicting theories of corporate personhood to support particular results, rather than as
guiding principles to help reach them.” (footnotes omitted)). See also supra notes 63–65 and R
accompanying text.
70. See Buccola, supra note 15, at 508 & n.39. . R
71.  75 U.S. 168 (1868), overruled in part by U.S. v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
72. Id. at 178. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL216.txt unknown Seq: 16  2-AUG-16 9:45
574 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:559
term citizens,” Justice Field held for a unanimous Court, “applies only
to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to
the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and pos-
sessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed.”73
This is a version of a top-down or concession theory of the firm.  But
then, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,74 the Court
affirmed Justice Field’s appellate opinion (written when he was “rid-
ing circuit”), which recognized that a corporation had a constitutional
right as a “person” under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.75  In his appellate court opinion, Justice Field
noted that the term citizen had been “dropped” in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as compared with the Privileges and Immunities Clause.76
He concluded by endorsing, at least implicitly, a bottom-up or partici-
pant view of the firm:
[N]o state shall touch the life, the liberty, or the property of any
person, however humble his lot or exalted his station, without due
process of law; and no state, even with due process of law, shall
deny to any one within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.77
This ambivalence between top-down and bottom-up perspectives of
the firm continues in the judicial opinions in Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby.
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion adopts a bot-
tom-up participant view of the corporation similar to the one in Santa
Clara.78  On this view, firms are comprised of people, and they re-
present the real interests of people acting in the world through the
vehicle of organizations.  Therefore, constitutional protection should
extend to these institutions with respect to political speech.  To do oth-
erwise would trample on the legitimate constitutional rights of busi-
ness participants and accord too much power to the government.79
73. Paul, 75 U.S. at 177.
74. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
75. Id. at 409–10. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” (emphasis added)).
76. Cty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (Cir. Ct., D. Cal. 1883), aff’d, 118 U.S. 394
(1886); see also supra notes 72, 75 (quoting the two amendments). R
77. Santa Clara, 18 F. at 398–99; see also ORTS, supra note 16, at 11–12 (discussing Santa R
Clara’s “bottom-up” view of the firm).  More recently, the scope of equal protection rights for
business firms has been reduced. See, e.g., W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 674 (1981).
78. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 10–11 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s opinion). R
79. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40, 370–72 (2010).
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens adopts a version of the
top-down concession theory.80  He quotes Justice Marshall’s well-
known proposition in Dartmouth College v. Woodward,81 which
strongly supports the ability of the government to regulate corpora-
tions: “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law,
it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation con-
fers upon it . . . .”82  Justice Stevens echoes a strongly government-
centered view of the powers, rights, and duties of business corpora-
tions and other firms.
He goes on to argue, in a phrase later quoted by Justice Ginsburg in
her dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby:
[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires.  Corporations help structure and facilitate the
activities of human beings, to be sure, and their “personhood” often
serves as a useful legal fiction.  But they are not themselves mem-
bers of “We the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution
was established.83
Here, one hears the strains of Justice Field in Paul rather than the
Justice Field of Santa Clara.  For Justice Stevens, corporations cannot
be “citizens.”84  They cannot vote, and they should not complain if
their political speech is regulated or even entirely forbidden.85  Justice
Stevens’s references the Tillman Act, which banned all corporate con-
80. ORTS, supra note 16, at 243–44 (discussing Justice Stevens’ opinion in Citizens United). R
81. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
82. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428–29 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636).  For another landmark Supreme Court case favorably
citing this language from Dartmouth College, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69, 89 (1987).  Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby cites Dartmouth Col-
lege as well.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting).
83. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
84. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 470–75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasizing the role of “ordinary citizens” versus corporations).
85. As Justice Stevens ironically notes: “Under the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First
Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among
other things, a form of speech.” Id. at 424–25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  One scholar follows this line of thinking and argues that if corporations are deemed to
have moral capacity, they should, indeed, have a right to vote.  John Hasnas, Should Corpora-
tions Have the Right To Vote?: A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency (Normative
Bus. Ethics Workshop Series, Zicklin Ctr. for Bus. Ethics Research, Wharton School, Univ. of
Pa., 2014), http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/Vote%20Revised.pdf. This is a rhetorical
argument, however, and nobody seems to take the idea seriously that artificial entities should
have political voting rights.  Under free incorporation laws, millions of new entities would be
created in a regime allowing corporations to vote, which would make a mockery of the electo-
rate in a political democracy—which is precisely Justice Stevens’ point.
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tributions to political candidates.86  And he quotes Theodore
Roosevelt who proclaimed: “All contributions by corporations to any
political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden
by law. . . .”87
Because Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens adopt extreme oppos-
ing views of the firm—a bottom-up participant theory versus a top-
down concession theory—they talk past each other.  Additionally,
they each make mistakes that a more moderate institutional theory of
the firm can reveal and ameliorate.
Justice Kennedy overstates his argument when he repeatedly asserts
that there should be no constitutional difference based on the “iden-
tity” of a person—natural or organizational—for purposes of ex-
tending First Amendment protections for political speech.88  He uses
only a string citation (without parenthetical descriptions) to support
the broad assertion that “First Amendment protection extends to cor-
porations.”89  It is true that a number of precedents recognize some
degree of constitutional protection for corporate persons in the area
of political speech.90  Justice Kennedy goes too far, though, in claim-
ing that the Court “has thus rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differ-
ently under the First Amendment simply because such associations
are not ‘natural persons.’”91  Sometimes the Court has indeed treated
corporations differently.92
Justice Stevens rightly castigates the majority opinion for repeatedly
and uncritically invoking its “identity” rationale.93  His own counter-
86. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864–85 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)
(1994) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012))).
87. Id. (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message to the Senate and
House of Representatives (Dec. 5, 1905)).
88. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political
speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”).
89. Id. at 342 (listing cases).
90. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (holding that a for-
profit corporation had a constitutional right of free speech to oppose a state referendum on a tax
issue).
91. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343.
92. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens recounts the history of congressional regulation
of corporate activities in campaign finance beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 as well as the
Court’s precedents that interpret and generally defer to this legislation. Id. at 432–41 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He correctly points out that this line of cases draws
a “corporate/individual distinction” in the First Amendment context. Id. at 437 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  These precedents  support Justice Stevens’ claim that
the majority decision in Citizens United also violated foundational principles of stare decisis.  See
id. at 408–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. See id. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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examples, however, are inapt because they refer only to categories of
natural persons who are restricted in their exercise of political rights
of free speech, such as “students, prisoners, members of the Armed
Forces, foreigners, and [government] employees.”94  Better examples
would draw on the institutional persons that Justice Kennedy has in
mind.
Consider, for example, municipal corporations.  Imagine that the
Mayor of the City of Chicago decides to contribute city treasury funds
toward advocacy of an election campaign for President.  I do not think
that Justice Kennedy, or any of his brethren in the majority, would
agree that the simple fact that a city is incorporated should be inter-
preted to mean that it is a “person” sufficient to be accorded the sta-
tus of First Amendment protection in this context.  The reason is
obvious.  The City of Chicago’s taxpayers are likely to be divided on
the question of who the next President should be, and their funds paid
in taxes to the City are not intended for use toward a political purpose
outside of the City.  This is not to say that the Mayor cannot express
an opinion or endorse a candidate for President.95  But taxpayer funds
should not be allocated to campaigns elsewhere simply because a mu-
nicipality is a “corporation.”
Similarly, consider a subgroup of the federal government, such as
the United States Marine Corps.  For certain purposes, the Marines
are recognized as a separate institutional person.96  It would violate
basic principles of democratic government as currently structured,
however, to say that the Marines are an organizational person having
the authority to devote funds to political campaigns.  On the contrary,
the Armed Forces of the United States are careful to observe a princi-
ple of civilian control with respect to the elected office of the Presi-
dent and constraints enacted by Congress.  Just as individual members
of the Armed Forces are not permitted full rights of freedom of politi-
cal speech when serving, the organizational persons of the military
94. Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
95. And vice versa: presidents may endorse mayoral or other candidates for office.  I do not
deny that politicians will often find ways to help each other in elections.  The example in the text,
of course, riffs off President Obama’s actions in Chicago that appeared to support his friend
Rahm Emmanuel’s mayoral reelection bid. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Honors Workers and
Endorses a Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2015, at A16.  The point is that transfers of funds from
one government body to another for the purpose of electioneering should be frowned upon.
And legal limits should recognize what Stevens calls “a corporate/individual distinction.”  See
supra note 92. R
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Div., U.S.
Marine Corps Reserve, 380 F. Supp. 588, 589–90 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (rejecting, on constitutional
grounds, a request for an injunction to allow wearing short-hair wigs during annual training
deployments).
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(i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) are similarly restricted.97
Again the rationale is obvious: the military may favor or disfavor en-
gagement in war or other uses of force, and it would violate principles
of democratic government to allow the military to influence these de-
cisions on the basis of economic or professional self-interest.
Now shift the organizational focus slightly to consider business cor-
porations primarily involved in supplying the military with weapons.
The same rationale should apply to private defense contractors as to
the U.S. Department of Defense.  Under a strict reading of Citizens
United, Lockheed Martin and other companies might be seen to have
a right to participate directly in political elections.  In fact, most of
these companies impose ethical restrictions on themselves, but it nev-
ertheless makes sense that a government may, and probably should,
choose to restrict the political influence of the defense industry.98  At
least in some cases, then, strong public policy considerations support
an argument to examine the identity and purpose of a corporation or
other organization when deciding whether and how to allocate politi-
cal rights of free speech.
Another example concerns business firms that are either govern-
ment-owned, such as Amtrak or the U.S. Postal Service, or public-
private hybrids, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.99  These kinds
of firms reveal fine lines between public and private in a manner that
may cause difficulty if one simply extends First Amendment corporate
rights to these organizations without considering identity and con-
text.100  An inconsistent result would obtain if courts read Citizens
United to give these corporate entities general rights of political
97. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to
political electioneering on military bases as “wholly consistent with the American constitutional
tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control” because “[i]t is a
policy that has been reflected in numerous laws and military regulations throughout our his-
tory”); see also Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90
TEX. L. REV. 797, 799–801 (2012) (reexamining the role of the military within the contemporary
constitutional structure); Jeremy S. Weber, Political Speech, the Military, and the Age of Viral
Communication, 69 A.F. L. REV. 91, 99–104 (2013) (describing the traditional policy of “civilian
control of the military” and the corresponding “need for an apolitical military”).
98. See Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 549
(2002), for an elaboration of this concern as it pertains to various dimensions of business and
government interactions, including campaign finance law. See also LOCKHEED MARTIN, SET-
TING THE STANDARD: CODE OF ETHICS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT, http://www.lockheedmartin.
com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/ethics/code-of-conduct.pdf (last updated
June 2014) (describing Lockheed Martin’s internal governance policies).
99. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 110–11, 198–200 (discussing examples of government-owned R
and public-private hybrid firms).
100. See id. at 109–31 (discussing the “public/private distinction” as “two faces of the business
enterprise”).
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speech, yet continued to restrict individual government employees
from participating in various political activities.101
Recently, the Supreme Court demonstrated its facility for delving
into organizational details when dealing with a case that turned, in
part, on whether Amtrak was “a government entity” or “a private en-
tity.”102  A statute creating Amtrak and establishing its governance
structure plainly stated that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States Government.”103  It stated fur-
ther that Amtrak “shall be operated and managed as a for-profit cor-
poration.”104  These provisions convinced the D.C. Court of Appeals
to find Amtrak to be a private corporation, which was then found to
have unconstitutionally delegated powers to regulate “metrics and
standards” for passenger rail service that adversely affected the opera-
tions of the private freight railroad plaintiffs.105
However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Jus-
tice Kennedy, reversed.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion began with an
analysis of “Amtrak’s ownership and corporate structure,” observing
that the government owns all of the preferred stock and most of the
common stock (under the authority of the Secretary of Transporta-
tion) and that Amtrak’s board is also largely selected by the govern-
ment (i.e., the President appoints seven board members, with Senate
confirmation, and Amtrak’s president selects eight other members).106
Amtrak is also subject to pervasive governmental oversight and is re-
quired to follow other public interest objectives in addition to profit-
making (e.g., providing “efficient and effective intercity passenger rail
mobility” and ensuring “mobility in times of natural disaster”).107
Last but not least, Amtrak receives large subsidies from the govern-
ment, amounting to more than $1 billion annually.108
In the Amtrak case, Justice Kennedy demonstrates that the Court
can inquire into the legal details of “ownership and corporate struc-
ture” when it wants to do so.  His majority opinion in Citizens United,
however, falls short in this respect.  Imagine that Amtrak’s manage-
101. For a recent case upholding the ability of governments to restrict the political speech of
their employees when acting within their scope of official duties against a First Amendment
challenge, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
102. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R. RS., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228, 1231 (2015).
103. Id. at 1231 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3) (2012)).
104. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2)).
105. Id. at 1231 (citing Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C.
Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015)).
106. Id. at 1231.
107. Id. at 1232 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101(b), (c)(9)).
108. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232.
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ment decided in the future to allocate some of its funds to political
campaigns.  No current member of the Court would fail to see the
conflict of interest: a government-owned and government-subsidized
corporation attempting to influence the selection of its own public
monitors (the President and members of Congress).  Notice, however,
that a close look at private business corporations reveals conflicts of
interest among the participants in firms analogous to the conflicts of
interest in this Amtrak-based hypothetical.  This conceptual connec-
tion can be illuminated by reconsidering the limitations of the “share-
holder-protection” rationale advocated in Citizens United.
In Citizens United, the majority opinion rejects the “shareholder-
protection” argument advanced in Justice Stevens’ opinion (which
cites the precedent of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce109
for the proposition).110  The shareholder-protection argument sug-
gests that many shareholders may object (perhaps even a controlling
majority of them) to particular political positions taken by their firms
in political campaigns.  On the narrow facts of Citizens United itself,
the Court’s rejection of this argument may have been correct.  Be-
cause Citizens United was organized as a nonprofit political advocacy
group, even the for-profit corporations providing funds to it would
arguably have agreed with the political purpose of Citizens United,
though one might then wonder about the shareholders of the private
corporate donors.111  In any event, the Court’s holding is very broad
and seems to indicate that dissenting shareholders do not have a right
to object to political speech made by leaders and managers of the
companies in which they invest.  Justice Kennedy gestures toward the
mechanisms of “corporate democracy” as a potential check on mana-
gerial power, but he greatly overestimates the effectiveness of corpo-
rate governance in this domain.112  Corporate legal scholars know, as
Justice Stevens also notes in his opinion, that the instruments of cor-
porate governance used for political expression by shareholders are
109. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–49, 361–62; see id. at 475–78 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660–61).
111. One option for a narrower holding in Citizens United would have been for the Court to
allow for a de minimus amount of for-profit corporate contributions to a political nonprofit or-
ganization. Id. at 328–29; id. at 406–07 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The legally recognized ability of firms to donate “reasonable” amounts to charitable and philan-
thropic causes might have been read to support this exception. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
112. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62, 370 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 794, 794 n.34) (1978)).
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unlikely to prove satisfactory or effective.113  By empowering corpo-
rate management (and majority shareholders to some degree) to
make decisions about corporate political speech to influence elections,
the Court diminishes the interests (if not violates the rights) of dis-
senting shareholders.
However, shareholders should not be the only ones who matter.
Corporate firms are composed not only of equity-owning shareholders
but also other participants, including creditors and employees.  From
an institutional perspective, one sees that creditors and employees
also count as meaningful participants in firms for various purposes.
Creditors provide debt financing, which can often be as important to a
business firm as equity ownership.114  Employees act as agents of the
firm in many circumstances, and they also share in revenues through
labor contract arrangements.115  When a firm succeeds financially,
creditors and employees benefit as well as managers and shareholders.
An institutional understanding of the legal as well as the economic
structure of the firm, however, suggests that Justice Kennedy gets his
theory of the firm wrong when he implicitly considers only majority
shareholders and managers.  Justice Kennedy’s formalistic invocation
of “the corporation” as the rights holder conveniently obscures the
fact of these other participants’ interests and rights.  Particularly with
respect to political purposes, it is difficult to deny that Citizens United
inequitably grants greater rights and powers of political speech to top
managers and controlling shareholders who appoint these managers at
the expense of creditors, employees, and lower-level managers.116
Political Action Committees (PACs) were designed to address ex-
actly this problem, as Justice Kennedy himself recognizes.117  Al-
though campaign finance statutes barred corporations and unions
from “using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or elec-
tioneering communications,” PACs were authorized as “separate seg-
regated funds” that were “limited to donations from stockholders and
employees of the corporation or, in the case of unions, members of
the union.”118  Although some observers still criticized PACs as also
113. See id. at 476–77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. See ORTS, supra note 16, at 84–90 (examining the role of creditors in the legal structure R
of business firms).
115. See id. at 57–62, 72, 137 (examining the role of employees in firms).
116. On this view, the idea of “reverse piercing” a corporate entity in favor of respecting the
political or religious views of majority or sole shareholders should be limited by consideration of
other people who are participating directly in the business. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using
Reverse Veil Piercing To Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16
GREEN BAG 2D 235, 236 (2013).
117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
118. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1994) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012))).
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having undue influence on elections, PACs at least solved the problem
of using “other people’s money” for political purposes.119
Although Justice Stevens also makes this general argument in his
dissent, his theory of the firm is too narrow along another dimension.
Arguably, the question of relevant interests affected by corporate po-
litical speech include all of those who participate in the firm and add
to its overall wealth and power.  These interests include creditors and
employees as well as managers and shareholders.  As an institutional
legal theory of the firm shows—again to follow Dewey’s legal real-
ism—the boundaries of firms vary according to the question that is
asked.120  In the context of the political speech of citizens, it seems
relatively obvious that the interests of employees, creditors, and
shareholders should matter.  They are citizens as well as business par-
ticipants.  It is also not clear whether the authorization by a majority
of a firm’s shareholders approving a particular instance of corporate
political speech should be considered sufficient to justify or legitimate
the action.  Because the primary purpose of for-profit firms is eco-
nomic self-interest, then even controlling shareholders may hold dif-
ferent political views (and corresponding preferences about political
candidates) than corporate leaders who will presumably seek to ad-
vance the economic interests of their firms rather than their individual
political agendas.
Justice Kennedy’s strongest argument is that the interest of individ-
ual citizens who “listen” to corporate political speech is best respected
by recognizing a corporate right of free speech.121  However, even
from this perspective, an argument based on an institutional theory of
the firm might press the point regarding the scope of the distortion.
The point here is distinct from the “antidistortion rationale” pro-
moted by Justice Stevens in his dissent, which focuses on general ine-
qualities of wealth enabled by corporate structures of property and
power that may skew democratic government.122  The Court is correct
119. See Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 873 (2004) (citing LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY—
AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914)).
120. ORTS, supra note 16, at 6, 108 (citing Hart, supra note 24, at 19–23, 31–33, 40–45). R
121. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (“The First Amendment protects speech and speaker,
and the ideas that flow from each.”); see also Orts & Sepinwall, supra note 10, at 2290–91 (dis- R
cussing listener’s rights and providing further citations).  As I argue elsewhere in a co-authored
article, the corporate right involved in Citizens United is best conceived as a “primary organiza-
tional right” that resides in the organization itself (and subject to the organization’s control)
rather than a “secondary organizational right” that tracks the individual rights of organizational
participants.  Orts & Sepinwall, supra note 10, at 2295. R
122. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 464–75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The “antidistortion rationale” was adopted in the Austin case, which interpreted the “share-
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to respond that the First Amendment should not be interpreted to
handicap rich individuals in expressing their opinions.123  The relevant
“distortion” derives instead from the internal structure of authority in
for-profit firms.  Again, the organization of Citizens United is, per-
haps, unproblematic because it is a nonprofit corporation with a spe-
cifically political purpose.124 For-profit corporations and other
business firms, however, are organized with an aim to pursue profit
and economic gain.125  To assume that corporate political speech will
not be severely distorted by the economic structure of authority in for-
profit firms does not respect the organizational complexity of modern
society.  The political preferences and views of individual citizens do
not necessarily correspond to the economic interests that these same
people may follow in their roles as managers, employees, and inves-
tors in business firms.126
It is also true that the global structure of large corporate firms poses
a concern about the influence of foreign individuals and even nation-
states on the internal political processes of the United States.  This
charge leveled against the majority by Justice Stevens—and famously
repeated by President Obama in his State of the Union Address im-
mediately following the issuance of Citizens United—is overbroad.
Justice Stevens correctly points out in his dissenting opinion that cam-
paign finance restrictions are placed on foreign nationals, including
foreign-based corporations, though he goes overboard with his anal-
ogy, suggesting that the majority’s approach would have protected a
free speech right for Tokyo Rose during World War II.127  Justice Ken-
nedy correctly responds that Citizens United does not reach the ques-
tion of whether the government may have “a compelling interest in
preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our
holder protection rationale” as part of the same fabric. Id. at 464–65, 478 (citing Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
123. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350 (“The rule that political speech cannot be limited
based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment
generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”).
124. A future case might distinguish and limit Citizens United on this ground.
125. In this connection, Justice Stevens properly cites the American Law Institute’s well-
known principle of corporate governance. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 111, § 2.01(a))(“[A] corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).  However, Justice
Stevens omits the three exceptions given to profit seeking—namely following the law, ethical
considerations, and philanthropic contributions)—which expand the permissible scope of a
firm’s objective. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 111, § 2.01(b).
126. See ORTS, supra note 16, passim, for an elaboration of the different roles that individuals R
play in society regarding their relationships to firms.
127. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 423–24 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Nation’s political process.”128  He also observes that the relevant stat-
ute preventing political contributions and expenditures from foreign
nationals is not limited to “corporations or associations that were cre-
ated in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreign share-
holders.”129  At least in this respect, the Court leaves open the
possibility that for-profit corporations, which are open to investments
from foreign sources (and often also staffed by foreign managers),
would be refused First Amendment protection under Citizens United.
In this respect also, Justice Kennedy seems willing to recognize at
least some degree of discriminatory treatment of corporations based
on their “identity.”
Note that President Obama may therefore have been wrong on the
merits to accuse the Court in Citizens United of “open[ing] the flood-
gates to special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend
without limit in our elections,”130 and Justice Alito may have been
correct in mouthing “not true” in response during Obama’s State of
the Union speech.131  Whether President Obama or Justice Alito or
both were impolite, I leave to others better versed in political eti-
quette to decide.132
Notwithstanding any faux pas in expression, the fact that many dif-
ferent investors and employees from different countries are involved
in business enterprises in a global economy suggests that the “foreign
national” restriction may in fact cut back quite substantially on the
long-term scope of Citizens United.133  An institutional theory of the
firm suggests that revisiting the compromise of PACs may provide a
viable solution to channel political interests within firms (and unions
and perhaps other organizations as well) appropriately and in keeping
with the revealed preferences and views of U.S. citizens.
128. Id. at 362.
129. Id.
130. Address Before the Joint Session of the Congress the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS
75, 81 (Jan. 27, 2010).
131. See TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY:  MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE
FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 90 (2014), for one version of the interaction.
132. Compare Glenn Greenwald, Justice Alito’s Conduct and the Court’s Credibility, SALON
(Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.salon.com/2010/01/28/alito_2/ with Ashby Jones, On Obama v. Alito,
Who’s Right? Here’s Your Answer, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2010/01/29/on-obama-v-alito-whos-right-heres-your-answer/.
133. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 605–10 (2011) (arguing that future cases will adjust the holding of Citizens United to control
foreign influence on elections); Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the
First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 703 (2011) (“The Court . . . is likely to
uphold the restrictions to prevent undue foreign influence over elections.”).
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Just as the majority opinion in Citizens United suffers from theoreti-
cal weaknesses, Justice Stevens’ lengthy dissenting opinion is also vul-
nerable to critique from an institutional perspective on the firm.  He
privileges shareholders over other business participants with his em-
phasis of a “shareholder protection rationale.”134  As previously dis-
cussed, there is also good reason to expand this argument to include
what might be called an employee protection rationale and a creditor
protection rationale.135  In his dissent, Justice Stevens does not enter-
tain these possibilities because he implicitly adopts a shareholder-cen-
tered view of the corporation.  In a footnote, he explicitly declines to
consider that different theories of the firm may matter.
Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is concep-
tualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and
implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any
other recognized model. . . .  It is not necessary to agree on a precise
theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from nat-
ural persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might
therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human welfare
that is the object of its concern.136
Although this view may seem consistent with Dewey’s argument
that corporations are whatever the law says they are, an appeal simply
to the standards of “human welfare” suggests no constitutional limita-
tions to the government’s power to regulate firms at all.  Constitu-
tional protections, however, should be based on sturdier foundations
than general calculations of “human welfare.”  Justice Stevens misses
an opportunity here to engage with deeper questions about the nature
of corporate enterprises and grasps hold of a false dichotomy for sup-
port: arguing that the Court’s decision favoring corporate rights of po-
litical speech will “‘enhance the relative voice’ of some (i.e., humans)
over others (i.e., nonhumans).”137
Justice Stevens’ failure to recognize any constitutional limitations
protecting corporate rights may have been one reason that Justice
Scalia was provoked (although he was often easily provoked) to retort
that the dissenters had dredged up “corporation-hating quotations” to
support their cause for regulation.138  I do not dispute that the larger
issue here in the background is the problem of corruption emanating
134. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447, 475–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
135. See also supra notes 110–20 and accompanying text. R
136. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 465 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam)).
138. Id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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from large business enterprises, which history and much contempo-
rary academic analysis support (Justice Scalia to the contrary notwith-
standing).139 Citizens United has been decried as the end of campaign
finance law.140  And surely—combined with more recent cases, such
as McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission141—the “anticorrup-
tion rationale” appears to have been set aside by the current Court, at
least in general terms.142  But I leave for others to discuss these larger
institutional problems of corruption and campaign finance law.
My contribution here is to remark that an institutional theory of the
firm helps provide some concrete details about how business firms
work, who they involve, and how they set their priorities for internal
governance—including political priorities.143  A focus on the concrete
facts and relations of business firms reveals a continuing need to focus
on methods to preserve a democratic political process from undue in-
fluence and corruption by large economic interests.144  Political cor-
ruption is a long-standing social problem that has not only been
associated with the advent of large business firms but also with the
great inequalities of wealth that divide individuals.145  As Justice
Breyer writes in his McCutcheon dissent:  “Where enough money calls
139. For a several sources on the large issue of corruption in politics, see ELIZABETH DREW,
THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY (reissue ed. 2000);
BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (2d
ed. 1990); ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE
CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2009); ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUP-
TION (1988); and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSE-
QUENCES, AND REFORM (1999).
140. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
141. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down statutory limitations on the total amount of money
that individuals may contribute to many different political candidates).
142. The McCutcheon Court reads Citizens United as requiring evidence of quid pro quo cor-
ruption or “its appearance” for a constitutionally valid regulation. Id. at 1441.  At the same time,
McCutcheon accepts restrictions on contributions by individuals to particular candidates, even
though it struck down restrictions on aggregate contributions by individuals made to many dif-
ferent candidates.  Id. at 1442–43, 1451 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27).
143. As a practical matter, one reason to think that Citizens United may not prove as revolu-
tionary as some fear is that many large corporations may take a neutral political stance, not
wishing to displease customers, suppliers, or others, who may have different political loyalties.
See Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big Corporations
Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 653 (2011) (arguing that firms
are likely to adopt “prudentially pusillanimous policies” when it comes to political involvement,
even after being granted greater freedom of maneuver under Citizens United).
144. Dewey, supra note 1.  See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionaliz- R
ing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1399–1401 (2013), for an argument against adopting a
judicial definition of corruption, including the narrow quid pro quo assumptions in Citizens
United and, subsequently to her article, McCutcheon.
145. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014), for a historical overview in the U.S. context.  See ROB-
ERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE:  A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2014), for an
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the tune, the general public will not be heard.  Insofar as corruption
cuts the link between political thought and political action, a free mar-
ketplace of political ideas loses its point.”146  Close attention to the
legal structure of firms and the complexity of the relationships among
business participants exposes major fault lines that legal reforms may
then help to secure and manage with improved effectiveness and
fairness.
B. Hobby Lobby: Business and Freedom of Religion
Like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby illustrates that competing theo-
ries of the firm can interact in a subterranean and perhaps not always
conscious manner among the Justices of the Supreme Court.  Again
here, the majority opinion, this time written by Justice Alito (with the
same colleagues joining as in Citizens United), adopts a bottom-up
participant theory of the firm.147  And the main dissenting opinion by
Justice Ginsburg invokes a top-down concession theory.  In support of
her view, she cites both Dartmouth College, which she acknowledges
was decided “nearly two centuries ago,” as well as Justice Stevens’
claim in Citizens United that corporations “have no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”148
Justice Alito eloquently counters this last sentiment in his opinion.
Hobby Lobby involved three religiously oriented for-profit corpora-
tions (Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga), who claimed that re-
quirements under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA)149 violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 (RFRA).150  More specifically, the owners claimed
analysis focusing on the underlying economic inequality as the fundamental problem causing
political corruption; see also supra note 139. R
146. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The relatively recent report of a
hedge fund entrepreneur’s large political contributions supports this concern.  The generous
backer organized contributions of $31 million for a new network of “superPACs” enabled by
Citizens United and its progeny, including McCutcheon, to launch the presidential bid of Ted
Cruz. See Eric Lichtblau & Alexandra Stevenson, Behind Cruz Campaign’s Striking Start, a
Donor of Few Words, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2015, at A1.
147. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60, 2767–68 (2014).
148. Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent in part)); see also supra note
83 and accompanying text. R
149. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 110 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
150. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2764–66.  As one pundit noted, the RFRA acronym as
a spoken word has “the unfortunate resemblance to the sound of a hoarse Labrador retriever.”
Gail Collins, Indiana Loses Its Game, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2015, at A27. See generally Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4) (2012)).
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that the ACA required them to provide funding for an insurance
scheme for their employees to cover four methods of contraception,
which they deemed “abortifacients” and, therefore, against their relig-
ious principles to support.151  In his majority opinion, Justice Alito ex-
plains that the family-connected founders and owners of these
corporations employed “a familiar legal fiction” to establish their for-
profit corporate businesses.  He writes:
[I]t is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to
provide protection for human beings.  A corporation is simply a
form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.
An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of
the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who
are associated with a corporation in one way or another.  When
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corpora-
tions, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.  For exam-
ple, extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations
protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated
with the company.  Protecting corporations from government
seizure of their property without just compensation protects all
those who have a stake in the corporations’ financial well-being.
And protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the
humans who own and control those companies.152
Justice Alito concludes:  “Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the
human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do
anything at all.”153  This is an excellent statement of the bottom-up
participant view of the firm.
But notice a subtle shift in this description.  Justice Alito’s concep-
tion of the firm changes from a “body of law” that “specifies the rights
and obligation of the people (including shareholders, officers, and em-
ployees)” to one that defines a claim for the protection of “the relig-
ious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”154
An important key question here is:  What happened to the rights of
employees when the topic of religion within the firm arose?  They sim-
ply appear to have been ignored.
An institutional theory of the firm focuses attention on the chang-
ing boundary lines of the firm drawn by the law in different circum-
151. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2764–65.  The methods of contraception at issue were
two types of “morning after” pills and two kinds of intrauterine devices. Id. at 2765.  These
preventative health care measures had been required for women in health insurance policies
under the ACA and through regulations adopted following recommendations from the Institute
of Medicine. Id. at 2762.
152. Id. at 2768.
153. Id.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
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stances.  Again, the legal boundaries of firms change according to the
question asked.155  Consider employees: if the question involves the
authority of people acting as representatives of the firm and in the
firm’s name, then the law of agency and organizational structure will
determine the answer.  For example, an employee acts as the legal
“agent” of the firm in situations “within the scope of employment.”156
Contracts entered into by employees bind the firm and are considered
authoritative actions by the firm.157  Similarly, negligence by employ-
ees when acting on the job that physically harms other people is at-
tributed by operation of “vicarious liability” to the firm.158
It is also true, as Justice Alito assumes, that owners and managers
have principal roles in the organization of firms, including business
corporations.  And they have the authority to set the objectives and
strategies for the activities of the firm.  This role of governance in-
cludes organizational values, as Justice Alito nicely describes:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corpo-
rations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require
for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything
else, and many do not do so.  For-profit corporations, with owner-
ship approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is
not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian
and other altruistic objectives.  Many examples come readily to
mind.  So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take
costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go
beyond what the law requires.  A for-profit corporation that oper-
ates facilities in other countries may exceed the requirements of lo-
cal law regarding working conditions and benefits.  If for-profit
corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no appar-
ent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.159
Justice Alito is correct.  Owners and managers usually have the au-
thority to make decisions about a firm’s objective, including the values
it will follow in terms of its governance, operations, and general
activities.160
155. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. R
156. ORTS, supra note 16, at 56–61, 139–40; see also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness R
in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1997) (discussing modern vicari-
ous liability).
157. ORTS, supra note 16, at 57 (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.01, 6.02, R
6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)).
158. Id. (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.03(2)(b), 7.07, 7.08)).
159. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
160. Exceptions come to mind in situations in which employees have a role in the governance
of firms, such as through representation of rank-and-file employees on the board of directors,
European-style works councils, or collective bargaining over nondistributional issues.  For a gen-
eral overview of these situations, see Margaret M. Blair & Mark T. Roe, Introduction, in EM-
PLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 1–2 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999);
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However, the governance of firms also occurs within a background
of statutory and constitutional limitations that protect the rights as
well as the interests of employees and other business participants.
Justice Alito’s opinion recognizes that important laws regarding em-
ployment discrimination will trump religious values asserted by own-
ers, at least with respect to racial discrimination in employment
defended by an appeal to religious authority.161  It is unfortunate that
his opinion does not also expressly refer to other forms of employ-
ment discrimination, though one can infer that he, and most of his
brethren, would uphold other legal limitations of discrimination
against employees on the basis of sex, gender, ethnicity, national ori-
gin, and, yes, even religion!162
The real question in Hobby Lobby, then, is: Who counts as a rele-
vant member of a firm for purposes of deciding questions of the “free
exercise” of religion?163  As with many questions when business meets
religion (or, as in Citizens United, when business meets politics), the
Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the Boardroom, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 503, 504–05 (2000) (book review); Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, The Study of Works
Councils: Concepts and Problems, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND
COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 3, 4 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
These exceptions prove the general rule, however, of managerial and capital ownership control
of most firms.
161. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (“The principal dissent raises the possibility that dis-
crimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to
escape legal sanction.  Our decision today provides no such shield.  The Government has a com-
pelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard
to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical
goal.” (citation omitted)).
162. One of the big questions following Hobby Lobby is whether the case will sanction relig-
iously motivated discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 94 (2015) (“What
about discrimination based on sexual orientation?  This context is highly likely to present the
next cutting edge of RFRA claims by both religious nonprofits and for-profit companies.”).
Most recently, state legislation has mimicked Hobby Lobby to provide a possible legal basis for
discrimination against business customers based on religious objections to sexual orientation.
See Collins, supra note 150 (discussing Indiana’s statute and the response to it); Monica Davey et R
al., After Rights Clash, Two States Revise Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2015, at A12 (describ-
ing controversy over statutes in Indiana and Arkansas).  The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark
decision recognizing a constitutional right of same-sex marriage, following a line of precedents
expressing disapproval of discrimination based on sexual orientation, suggests that the judicial
winds are blowing strongly against such religious rights claims. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2593, 2608 (2015); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2006) (striking
down a criminal statute forbidding homosexual acts); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36
(1996) (invalidating a state constitutional provision aimed at disallowing nondiscrimination state
statutes or municipal ordinances).
163.  Hobby Lobby is a “free exercise” case, though as translated through a statutory riff
following previous Supreme Court decisions.  For an authoritative account of the two pillars of
freedom of religion under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, see 1–2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL216.txt unknown Seq: 33  2-AUG-16 9:45
2016] THEORIZING THE FIRM 591
answers are not easy.  For example, laws against employment discrimi-
nation have often been drafted to exclude very small business firms, as
measured by the number of employees.  The ACA, which was at issue
in Hobby Lobby, exempts firms with less than fifty employees.164  The
scope of other statutes, such as the principal federal statutes prohibit-
ing discrimination in employment based on characteristics of race,
color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age, disabil-
ity, or genetic information, are also limited by business size.165  As
Justice Ginsberg observes in her dissent, these statutes set varying lim-
its for exemptions, ranging from less than fifteen employees (for race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex) to less than fifty employees (for
age).166  One way to explain these limitations is that they accord some
degree of deference and legal immunity to small family businesses, as
well as other closely knit firms holding religious values.  As firms grow
larger, however, they then should arguably participate with a more
“public” face that accommodates general views of permissible prac-
tices in areas such as employment.167
With respect to religion and business firms, the Court in Hobby
Lobby gets the answer wrong because it sees owners and top manag-
ers as having a greater claim to assert religious values than the em-
ployees who work for them.  There is no dispute that the plaintiff
firms in Hobby Lobby must comply with employment discrimination
laws, which virtually assure that the firms are comprised of employees
with a diversity of religious (and nonreligious) values.  At the time of
litigation, Hobby Lobby had 13,000 employees, Conestoga had 950,
and Mardel had 400.168  Given that the firms must not discriminate
based on religion in their hiring practices, it is safe to assume that at
least some women employees in these firms disagree with the religious
principles of their employers.  Moreover, the employees’ rights to con-
traception are not minimal.  As Justice Alito recognizes, the Constitu-
164. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), 4980H (c)(2),
5000A(f)(2) (2012)).
165. For this list of current prohibited categories of employment discrimination, see Prohib-
ited Employment Practices/Policies, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc
.gov/laws/practices/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
166. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2800–01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Notably, Title VII “ex-
pressly exempt[s] churches and other nonprofit religious institutions but not for-profit corpora-
tions.” Id. at 2773 (citing the statute and the government’s brief).  However, Justice Alito does
not find this argument persuasive with respect to drawing an analogous line with respect to the
ACA because the statute is not explicit in the same way.  Id.
167. See generally ORTS, supra note 16, at 109–31 (describing the “public” face of “private” R
business firms).  Another argument favoring small businesses in this context involves the greater
transaction costs of compliance for them as compared with larger businesses.
168. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–65.
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tion has been interpreted to include a right of privacy to use
contraception.169
A good argument can therefore be made that religious rights should
be recognized in situations in which the members of the firm—includ-
ing employees—are likely to share the same religious affiliation.
Carving out small firms of less than fifteen employees seems to be
about right as an approximation, recognizing that a somewhat arbi-
trary line must be drawn somewhere.  However, the scope granted in
Hobby Lobby with respect to thousands of employees appears much
too wide if employees’ religious and other constitutional rights are
taken seriously and respected.  The Court’s focus, by the way, on
“close corporations” is a red herring.  As Justice Ginsburg observes in
her dissenting opinion, closely held corporations can become quite
large in terms of both capitalization and numbers of employees.170
For instance, the family-owned Mars candy company accounts for
about $33 billion in annual revenues and around 72,000 employees.
Cargill is a closely held corporation with more than $136 billion in
revenues and approximately 140,000 employees.171  At least, however,
Justice Alito’s opinion counts out large publicly traded corpora-
tions.172  The logic of his analysis regarding family-owned firms with
strong and consistent advocacy of religious principles as founding
principles should also limit the potential expansion of Hobby Lobby
to firms with diversity among employees as well as diversity among
owners.
The saving grace (so to speak) appears in the least restrictive means
that the Court maintains is available to secure the important rights
and interests of women employees affected by the Court’s decision.
Justice Alito points out that the Obama Administration may use an
alternative method of insurance provisioning that has been created to
169. In Justice Alito’s words:  “Under our cases, women (and men) have a constitutional right
to obtain contraceptives . . . .” Id. at 2779–80 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485–86 (1965)).
170. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“‘Closely held’ is not
synonymous with ‘small.’”).
171. Id. (citing America’s Largest Private Companies 2013, FORBES, (Dec. 18, 2013), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/andreamurphy/2013/12/18/americas-largest-private-companies-2013/).
172. Id. at 2774.  Still, Justice Alito’s reasoning in this context is troubling.  He argues that “it
seems unlikely” that “corporate giants,” including publicly traded firms, “will often assert RFRA
claims” because of “numerous practical restraints.” Id.  “For example,” he continues, “the idea
that unrelated shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of stakehold-
ers—would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable.” Id.
This answer does not alleviate concerns that many large privately held enterprises could “agree
to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs” and ignore the religious diversity of their
employees.
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serve the employees of religious organizations and religious nonprof-
its.173  Under this accommodation, argues Alito, the effect “on the
women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved
in these cases would be precisely zero.”174
This consideration suggests the potential for a narrow reading of the
Hobby Lobby holding, and the deciding vote cast by Justice Kennedy
reinforces this interpretation.  In his concurring opinion, Kennedy rec-
ognizes the tensions involved between the religious beliefs of employ-
ers and those of employees.  Leaning heavily on the availability to the
government of a least restrictive alternative, he argues more generally
that these questions are not easy ones.  In his words:
In our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all persons
have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator and a
divine law.  For those who choose this course, free exercise is essen-
tial in preserving their own dignity and in striving for a self-defini-
tion shaped by their religious precepts.  Free exercise in this sense
implicates more than just freedom of belief.  It means, too, the right
to express those beliefs and to establish one’s religious (or nonreli-
gious) self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our
larger community.  But in a complex society and an era of pervasive
governmental regulation, defining the proper realm for free exercise
can be difficult.175
In Hobby Lobby, the important rights of employees—which include
religious rights as well as constitutional rights of privacy—are masked
by an implicit theory of the firm that hides employees from proper
recognition and possible coverage.176  Employees should have the
right to express their beliefs and establish their own “religious (or
nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of
our larger community.”177  It is true, as the Court holds, that the term
“person” as defined in RFRA—as well as the Constitution—refers to
business firms as well as individual people.178  What remains to be
done, however, is to argue in legal terms about who counts as a mem-
ber of a firm for the purposes of respecting fundamental religious (and
173. Id. at 2780–83.
174. Id. at 2760.
175. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
176. The argument favoring the recognition of employees’ religious rights was urged on the
Court in an amicus brief of religious and nonprofit organizations, including representatives of
Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Unitarian Universalist, and other faiths.  Brief for Religious Orgs. as
Amici Curiae Supporting the Government, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354/13-356),
2014 WL 333898.
177. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2768 (citing RFRA’s reference to “a person exercising religion” and the Dictionary
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), defining “person” to include “corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”).
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nonreligious) rights and values.  The answer is neither given in the
dictionary (or the Dictionary Act) nor provided by old theories of the
firm.  Once again, as Dewey observes, larger questions are implicated
in this legal definition involving historical “struggles and movements,”
including those regarding the relationships of business and religion in
society.179
Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Ginsburg’s vigorous dissent does not
grasp the nettle of the problem in Hobby Lobby in terms of a legal
theory of the firm either.  Instead, her opinion implicitly concedes the
importance of the women’s rights involved by inexplicably agreeing to
characterize female employees as “third parties who do not share the
owner’s religious faith.”180  Why, though, should one characterize em-
ployees as third parties in their own firms with respect to questions of
freedom of religion and choice about a constitutionally protected area
of privacy (i.e., contraception)?181  The failure to include a theory of
the firm that can encompass employees as well as owners leads to an
inadvertent devaluation of employees’ religious and other fundamen-
tal rights.
As previously noted, Justice Ginsburg follows an abstracted top-
down theory of the firm.182  This posture puts her at a conceptual dis-
179. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  As some scholars and commentators R
warn, organized religions pose a significant danger to individual rights when they impose or
attempt to impose their religious values on others. See e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008); MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE (2012); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF
RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006); WHOSE GOD
RULES?  IS THE UNITED STATES A SECULAR NATION OR A THEOLEGAL DEMOCRACY? (Nathan
C. Walker & Edwin J. Greenlee eds., 2011) (collecting essays).  For broader social theoretical
analysis, see also JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION:  PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS (2008).
180. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. As Justice Ginsburg notes, the interests of the employees’ dependents are also impli-
cated. Id.  I would argue that these dependents are the true “third parties” involved, and  they
also deserve protection.  See Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting
“Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 437–38 (2014), and
Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions After
Hobby Lobby, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1905–07 (2015), for strong arguments that future cases
should take the effects on third parties much more seriously in religious accommodation situa-
tions than does Hobby Lobby.  Loewentheil makes the point also that characterizing women in
these cases as “third parties” is a misnomer.  She prefers the term “rights-holders,” though for
her the relevant relationship is between women and rights of statutory coverage provided by the
government.  Loewentheil, supra note 181, at 467–68.  I am arguing here for employees to be R
recognized as having an ontological status as members of their firms for purposes of analysis
concerning religious and constitutional rights regarding their own health care, which may include
access to contraception.
182. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. R
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advantage to Justice Alito.  At the same time that the Court empha-
sizes the “rights” of the owners and managers of Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel, Justice Ginsberg is reduced to appealing to
the “significant interests” of women employees.183  A failure to step
into an analysis of the real workings of firms—which reveals employ-
ees as a vital component of them—allows the majority to claim, at
least rhetorically, the high ground of “religious rights” as opposed to
mere health “interests.”  Employees are seen as external to the firm
rather than internal—which concedes the authority to the firm’s own-
ers to make decisions about religious values even when these deci-
sions primarily affect the rights of the employees.
Considering this last point may help to navigate the boundaries of
religion and business in future cases after Hobby Lobby, especially
those that have no easy accommodation available as a least restrictive
alternative that may please everybody (with the exception of the gov-
ernment bureaucrats forced to create the new program or make ad-
justments to an existing one).184  Justice Alito is correct that business
governance involves the selection and choice among values, and many
management decisions may permissibly make reference to these val-
ues.185  For example, it is difficult to imagine that religious principles
should somehow be segregated from everyday business ethics.186  At
the same time, Justice Ginsburg is also correct to remind us of the
general principle that “[y]our right to swing your arm ends just where
the other man’s nose begins.”187  In cases to be decided after Hobby
Lobby, the right of private business owners to exercise their freedom
183. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. 2799 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (referring to employees’ “interests” rather than rights).
184. Justice Alito recognized this burden on the government but argued that the need to re-
spect religious views of business owners was sufficient to justify the additional expense. Id. at
2781.  In future cases, the Court recognized that “cost may be an important factor in the least-
restrictive-means analysis” weighing religious rights against government efficiency. Id.
185. On this score, Justice Alito mentions the persuasive example of new “hybrid corporate
forms,” including the “benefit corporation,” which has been recognized by statutes passed in
over one-half of the states and allows for the creation of “a dual-purpose entity that seeks to
achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.” Id. at 2771. See generally
ORTS, supra note 16, at 206–15 (providing an overview of “hybrid social enterprises,” including R
benefit corporations).
186. Cf. Martin S.J. Calkins, Recovering Religion’s Prophetic Voice for Business Ethics, 23 J.
BUS. ETHICS 339, 347 (2000) (arguing in favor of including religious values in business ethics);
Timothy L. Fort, Religion and Business Ethics: The Lessons from Political Morality, 16 J. BUS.
ETHICS 263 (1997) (surveying various political theories arguing for different views of treating
religion with respect to business ethics).
187. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919)).
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of religion should end at the bodies of women employees who may
disagree and hold different fundamental religious and moral values.188
III. CONCLUSION
Developing a theory of the firm by examining the concrete facts and
relations of the role of law in their construction can provide greater
analytical clarity to address controversies that will no doubt continue
with respect to the institutional lines separating business firms from
the processes of democratic government, on one hand (with a gesture
to Citizens United), and the commitments of diverse religions, on the
other (with a wave to Hobby Lobby).  In this Article, I hope to have
made the case that the legacy of John Dewey, as supported by con-
temporary philosophers of organizational ontology, such as John
Searle and Philip Pettit, urges scholars, judges, and policy makers to
pay close attention to the legal foundations of business firms rather
than continue to rely implicitly on nonlegal theories of corporations
and firms that have plagued the law for generations.  Doing so may
help clear the undergrowth of unhelpful arguments positing that firms
are either composed only of their participants (and sometimes only a
select class of participants) or are merely governmental creations that
can therefore be manipulated by the government at will.  A broader
institutional theory of the firm reveals a diversity of real individual
interests and complex constellations of rights involved in firms.  Tak-
ing greater care to understand the legal relationships and social ontol-
ogy of business firms may pave a road toward regulatory and judicial
decisions that can best address continuing large-scale social issues, in-
cluding combating corruption, respecting diverse faiths, and finding an
appropriate balance among the institutions of business, government,
and religion in our complex modern society.189
188. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of
RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173 (2015), for an argument
that it makes sense, in some circumstances, to recognize the ability of corporate managers and
owners to exercise religious rights through their corporations (in the absence, I would add, of
circumstances that would violate similar fundamental rights of their employees or other manag-
ers and owners).
189. Another direction forward suggested by Amy Sepinwall, which I have not emphasized
here, would focus on a “teleological” analysis concerning the purpose of an organization rather
than the “ontological” analysis about the nature of an organization, which I have focused on in
this Article. See id. at 179.  A teleological approach is probably useful at least in drawing some
bright lines separating nonprofit and for-profit organizations, but this topic lies beyond the scope
of this Article.  I believe that following a teleological approach to organizational analysis can be
consistent with an ontological approach.
